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Paul Stock
Liberty and Independence: The Shelley–Byron Circle
and the State(s) of Europe
Introduction
How did Byron, the Shelleys and their circle
react to the political reconstruction of Europe
following Napoleon’s final defeat in 1815? How
did they understand the ‘state’ or ‘condition’ of
Europe after twenty-six years of ideological and
military conflict? This article investigates how
the Shelleys, Byron and John Cam Hobhouse
analyse the European political situation in the
eighteen months immediately following
Waterloo. In particular, it discusses how they
interpret European politics through use of the
words ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’. Sometimes this
language of freedom constructs a transnational
European community, in which states are
connected by their shared commitment to ‘free’
government. Complicating this, however, the
circle also associate ‘freedom’ with ideas of state
independence; that is, a Europe divided into
rival states independent from one another and
not necessarily unified by any common
tradition. In this respect, the idea of ‘freedom’
both evokes and challenges notions of a
common European identity. These different
usages might appear to be straightforwardly
contradictory, but they can be connected,
I want to suggest, using the argument of
William Hazlitt’s essay ‘On Patriotism’
(1814), which argues for a patriotic politics
that can legitimise transnational collective
identity.
The European Tradition
of Freedom
In 1815 and 1816, the Shelley–Byron circle
produced a number of texts which, directly and
indirectly, reflect on the current ‘state’ of
European politics. This includes the third Canto
of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, which Byron
wrote between May and September 1816 as he
travelled to Switzerland;1 Hobhouse’s published
work on Napoleon’s downfall, based on his
experiences in Paris in mid-1815; and the
Shelleys’ writings immediately following
Waterloo and on their own excursion to
Switzerland in 1816, particularly the History
of a Six Weeks’ Tour. These texts, as I suggest
below, attempt to delineate a ‘tradition of
freedom’: a shared trajectory for European
countries which identifies both a common
history and the prospect of future unity.
In doing this, however, they follow established
lines of thought about the relationship between
‘Europe’ and ‘freedom’. In order to understand
the Shelley–Byron circle’s distinctive
contributions to this idea, I would first
like to note its common currency in
eighteenth-century works.
Many eighteenth-century reference books
devote considerable space to defining and
outlining a European tradition of ‘free’
government. For example, William Guthrie, a
best-selling historian and geographer whose
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Geographical, Historical and Commercial
Grammar (1770) ran to twenty-four editions
by 1827, describes Europe as ‘unrestrained’ in
commerce, government and religion, especially
when compared to the ‘tyrannical’ regimes of
Asia.2 This difference between European and
Asian governmental traditions is explained in
terms of environmental factors: Guthrie’s New
System of Modern Geography (1792) suggests
that the spread of despotism is prevented in
Europe by the varied land-surface forming
‘natural barriers which check the progress of
conquest’. In Asian countries, the large extent
of land makes despotism inevitable, since only
one individual ruling by force can keep the
country in order. In Europe, however, ‘the
barren rocks and mountains are more
favourable for exciting human industry and
invention, than the natural unsolicited
luxuriancy of more fertile soils’. For this
reason, ancient Greece is where the human
mind ‘began to avail itself of its strength’ and
where European ‘industry and invention’
began, because it is the most variable and
broken of territories. Greece’s development
epitomises Europe’s: it is an exemplar of ‘equity
of laws and the freedom of political
constitution’.3 Some eighteenth-century
reference books even define the word ‘Europe’
itself in terms of freedom. According to the
anonymous Complete System of Geography
(1747), as well as a large number of other
sources, Europe ‘is called [. . . ] “Alfrank” by the
Turks; “Frankoba” by Georgians; and
“Frankistan” by Asian peoples’.4 This is
particularly interesting given that the word
‘frank’ has etymological associations with ‘free’
and ‘freedom’: according to the OED, ‘frank’
can mean ‘free in condition; not in serfdom or
slavery’; ‘released from captivity’; ‘free from
restraint or impediment’.5 Of course, it is not
entirely clear whether non-Europeans
genuinely saw Europe as the ‘land of the free’,
or whether this was how Europeans imagined
that others saw them.6 Nevertheless, the idea of
Europe is being constructed through association
with ‘freedom’ and by contrast with the
decadent tyrannies of Asia.
By the early nineteenth century therefore,
the ideological association between Europe and
freedom had become well established. The
author of the 1824 Supplement to the [. . . ]
Encyclopaedia Britannica summarises these
current ideas by defining European liberty more
precisely. He speaks of the freedom to worship
as one pleases, freedom to trade, freedom to
formulate one’s own laws, freedom from
tyrannous government: advantages which are
only found, he claims, in European states. Most
importantly, he traces this European freedom
throughout history – from ‘the freedom of
Grecian states’ to exist independently (prior to
conquest by Macedon), to ‘freedom of
commerce in modern day Britain’.7 The
Supplement uses this notion to construct a
shared European historical development and
identity. In other words, the idea of political
and commercial ‘freedom’ is what connects
ancient Greece, fifteenth and sixteenth-century
Italian city-states and modern Britain together.
‘Freedom’ is what makes Renaissance Italy the
successor to ancient Greece and modern Britain
the heir of the Renaissance; and this ‘freedom’
therefore makes it meaningful to speak of a
‘European’ cultural tradition transmitted
through different periods and societies. Indeed,
for the Supplement, ‘freedom’ drives the
gradual development of ever-improving
governmental systems and intellectual
achievement in Europe.
The Shelley–Byron Circle and European
Freedom
In 1815–16 the Shelley–Byron circle reinterpret
this ‘libertarian tradition’ to take account of
recent historical events – particularly the Allies’
victory over Napoleon. In the History of a Six
Weeks’ Tour (1817), for example, Mary Shelley
hopes that ‘fellow feeling’ for liberty can
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reform all European countries after the recent
victories of the monarchical powers:
All those of every nation in Europe who
have a fellow feeling with the oppressed [. . . ]
cherish an unconquerable hope that the
cause of liberty must at length prevail.8
Mary Shelley’s use of ‘liberty’ has a
distinctly radical aspect: she employs the word
to signify opposition to the ‘hostile garrisons’
and ‘detested dynasties’ of monarchy. Instead,
the prospect of ‘free’ (that is, non-monarchical)
government can potentially reform the
war-torn remnants of Europe, uniting the
separate nations behind common governmental
principles. In using ‘liberty’ to indicate desire
for reform, Mary Shelley is tapping into a
developing political vocabulary: as Michael
Rossington observes, ‘ “liberal” in the sense of
“favourable to constitutional change” [was] a
recently-established English usage’ which first
occurred in the early nineteenth century.9
Furthermore, the phrase ‘fellow feeling’ evokes
Margaret Cohen and April Alliston’s notion of
the ‘sentimental community’. For them,
popular eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
texts by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Germaine de
Staël and others induce an ‘emotional
connection that transcends nations’ by
appealing to a wide community of readers not
limited by national borders.10 Mary Shelley
gives this concept a political dimension: she
suggests that ‘fellow feeling’ for liberty allows
one to comprehend Europe in terms of
transnational political principles, rather than as
separate national identities. In this way,
Europe’s past and future are defined by
‘sympathy’ for libertarian causes.
Byron, however, seems less optimistic about
the prospects for ‘free’ government. In Childe
Harold III, he identifies a tradition of freedom
under threat:
While Waterloo with Cannae’s carnage vies
Morat and Marathon twin names shall stand,
They were true Glory’s stainless victories,
Won by the unambitious heart and hand
Of a proud, brotherly and civic band,
All unbright champions in no princely cause
Of vice-entail’d Corruption; they no land
Doom’d to bewail the blasphemy of laws
Making kings rights divine, by some
Draconian clause. (608–16)
In this meditation on European history, the
tradition of freedom is evident in the battles of
Morat and Marathon, victories, according to
Jerome McGann, ‘of men fighting for their
liberty’ (Byron, PW, ii. 307n). In more recent
times, the French general Marceau’s service in
the Revolutionary Wars contributed to the
cause of liberty:
He was Freedom’s champion, one of those,
The few in number, who had not o’erstept
The charter to chastise which she bestows
(549–51).
For Byron, as for Mary Shelley, Europe’s
achievements are defined by the liberty and
common purpose associated with opposition to
monarchical power. But Childe Harold also
articulates another tradition which seeks to
limit that freedom: the ‘Draconian clause’
which resists the efforts of the ‘civic band’.
Europe’s history and future is thus based on
conflict between advocates and opponents of
freedom. Caroline Franklin argues that Childe
Harold is ‘a profound elegy for the permanent
loss of political freedom in the cycles or
“revolutions” of European history’. Byron’s
pessimism, she says, ‘deconstructed the Whigs’
and the radicals’ view of history as progress’.11
In fact, however, Byron understands European
freedom as a concept in flux, not just inexorable
decline. Although Waterloo appears to be a
victory for the ‘Draconian clause’, hope still
exists:
We do not curse thee Waterloo!
Though Freedom’s blood thy plain bedew;
There ‘twas shed, but is not sunk –
Rising from each gory trunk,
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Like the water-spout from ocean,
With a strong and growing motion –
It soars and mingles in the air. (‘Ode (from
the French)’, 1–7)12
The poem seems to suggest that cause of
freedom has been set back by Napoleon’s
defeat. And yet Napoleon himself is described
both as ‘Freedom’s son’ (27), and as a proud,
monarch, a hero who ‘sank into a King’
(33) –meaning that his downfall
simultaneously marks the defeat of both ‘free’
government and kingly arrogance. This
ambiguous presentation of Napoleon expresses
uncertainty over Europe’s direction: does
Napoleon’s deposition indicate a continuation
of or a disruption in the tradition of freedom?
As the poem continues, the speaker strives to
answer this question, eventually claiming that
‘Freedom rejoices’ (73) because ‘France hath
twice been too well taught / The ‘moral lesson’
clearly bought – / Her safety sits not on a
throne [. . . ] / But in equal rights and laws’
(77–81). This freedom can be found, not in the
competition of nations (Pouring nations’ blood
like water, / In imperial seas of slaughter!
[89–90]), but in European ‘fellow feeling’:
where ‘the heart and mind, / And the voice of
mankind, / Shall arise in communion’ (91–3).
Despite the apparent victory of the Allied
monarchies, Waterloo ultimately confirms the
potential development of European liberty.
In The Siege of Corinth (also published in
early 1816), Byron is similarly concerned for
the loss, and possible recovery, of freedom. The
speaker laments how ‘Venice ceased to be / Her
ancient civic boast – ”the Free”‘ (84–5), before
tracing the history (and future prospects) of
that ‘freedom’ back to Christianity and ancient
Greece, now overrun with oriental despotism:
“Till Christian hands to Greece restore / The
freedom Venice gave of yore’ (104–5). Like the
Supplement to [. . . ] Britannica, the poem uses
‘freedom’ to connect different periods and
locations as part of a discernable tradition, but
unlike the reference book, it also discusses
manifest threats to that freedom, mainly from
‘the Moslem’s sway’ (107). The use of Venice is
particularly important here. Malcolm Kelsall
suggests that, for Byron, Venice was not only
‘the meeting place of Occident and Orient in a
direct imperial and religious conflict’, but also
signifies the ‘transition of a former imperial
power to colonial status’, particularly after
Napoleon conquered and abolished the
Venetian Republic in 1797.13 In this respect,
Venice represents the intricate constructions
and tensions of European history: empire and
colony, Christianity and Islam, freedom and
tyranny. Byron’s awareness of these complex
interactions makes him cynical about
unthinkingly optimistic ideas of progress, but
this scepticism does not, I would suggest, define
his conception of post-Napoleonic Europe and
its potential for ‘free’ government.
John Cam Hobhouse, Byron’s friend and
travelling companion, also muses on the
complexities of the libertarian tradition: ‘it
cannot be concealed, there is in the flight of
Napoleon a precipitancy which nothing can
escape; and we must sigh as Montesquieu did
over the suicide of Brutus, to see the cause of
liberty so easily abandoned’.14 Hobhouse
identifies Napoleon with a tradition of freedom
that extends deep into history, beyond the
philosophes and back to the classical world. Like
Byron, though, he is preoccupied by the
prospective failure of that tradition. Indeed,
Napoleon seems to embody both the possibility
of greater liberty and the disappointments of its
dissipation. If here he is the banished emblem
of freedom, later his presence, rather than his
absence, hinders liberty’s progress: ‘France
would have now been free had not Napoleon
come back’ (Recollections, ii. 3). In Letters
Written During the Last Reign of the Emperor
Napoleon (1816), Hobhouse elaborates further
on exactly what he means by ‘freedom’. He
identifies a ‘proper’ tradition of monarchy
which should operate uniformly throughout
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Europe, but at present exists only in
England –where ‘the rights of the citizen’ are
respected and ‘the desire of freedom has made
the capital [. . . ] affluent in money and men, so
their wealth gave them the ability to defend
and confirm their independence’.15 Despite this
stress on British ‘independence’, Hobhouse
envisages this as a European-wide ideal,
proposing that all states should strive for this
condition. As an Empire, France had drawn
closer to this model system, for despite ‘the
tyranny of Napoleon’, ‘the circumstances of his
elevation [. . . ] confirm the notions of the power
of individual exertion, and the original equality
of man’ (Last Reign, i. 218). By contrast,
Castlereagh’s political objective – to restore
the ‘ancient social system’ of
monarchies – completely betrays the notion of
European liberty by supporting despotic
regimes and refusing to acknowledge that other
states should be free to govern themselves
(i. 222). There is an inconsistency here:
Hobhouse opposes Britain being ‘the arbitress
of Europe’ (i. 225), but still upholds the British
governmental system as the ideal model for the
realisation of European freedom. This leads him
into slightly self-contradictory territory,
arguing that both Britain and Napoleon’s
France alternately represent and prevent the
development of liberty.
However, the term ‘freedom’ is not merely
used by radical thinkers like Mary Shelley,
Byron and Hobhouse. The conservative scholar
T. H. Horne, writing in 1816, rejoices that
Napoleon’s downfall has ‘gladdened the heart
of every lover of freedom’, since his usurpation
was an offence to Europe’s ancient traditions.
He calls the Napoleonic Wars ‘The Campaign of
the Liberties of Europe’, suggesting that a ‘free’
Europe is one which replicates the pre-1789
status quo.16 Castlereagh himself even employs
this terminology to justify British government
policy: ‘the powers of Europe’, he says, treating
the sub-continent as a totality, ‘have been
compelled, in vindication of their own liberties,
and for the settlement of the world, to invade
France’.17 This language recalls William
Robertson’s use of ‘liberty’ in the 1760s. In his
View of the Progress of Society in Europe,
Robertson refers to the balance of power in
terms of liberty: ‘the method of preventing any
monarch from rising to such a degree of power,
as was inconsistent with the general liberty’.18
This associates the word with ‘stability’, a usage
which contrasts with liberal and radical writers
who employ ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ to refer to
changes in governmental organisation. For the
anti-establishment political writer George
Ensor, whose On the State of Europe appeared
in 1816, ‘free nations’ are to be contrasted with
‘the abyss of monarchy’. Alluding to the
precedent of ancient Athens, he asserts that
monarchy, not Revolutionary France, is an
aberration from the proper order of things.19
These writers base their understandings of
European history and futurity upon different
notions of freedom, using various
interpretations of the libertarian tradition to
analyse contemporary politics and to construct
teleologies of what Europe should be like, based
on a conception of its ‘free’ past.
Percy Shelley, however, directly challenges
the concept of a free tradition particular to
European states. In a fragment known to
editors as ‘The Elysian Fields’ and written
either in 1815 or 1816, the speaker says that:
the English nation does not, as has been
imagined, inherit freedom from its ancestors.
Public opinion rather than private institution
maintains it in whatever portion it may now
possess [. . . ] As yet the gradation [by] which
this freedom has advanced has been
contested step by step.20
These sentences make ‘freedom’ iconoclastic,
opposed to institutions and continually
re-imagined by each generation, not passed on
in an identifiable tradition or progression.
Moreover, because Shelley emphasises both the
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Englishness and the locality of the ‘public
opinion’ which defines this freedom, his
suggestions stand against the more general
‘European liberty’ identified by Byron and
Hobhouse, which extends from ancient Greece
to the Revolution as part of abstract tradition.
This idea treats freedom as a progress theory,
sometimes hindered, but gradually developing
in a single direction. Instead, Shelley
emphasises the multiplicity of possible futures:
how a momentary popular reassessment of
freedom, disconnected from previous
interpretations, can abruptly change society, or
literally free it from its past.
Liberty and the State
of Independence
‘Liberty’, then, often evokes a common
European ideal – a notion of how Europe can be
shaped through the alleged liberation of the
Revolution or (for conservative writers) the
freedoms of the ‘ancient social system’.
However, liberty is also associated with ideas of
state independence: that is, a Europe divided
into rival national blocs with no shared
tradition. Byron’s friend James Wedderburne
Webster employs ‘freedom’ in a strictly
patriotic context in his poem ‘Waterloo’ (1816),
asserting the supremacy of England over its
enemies: Wellington’s victory ‘Hath swell’d his
Country’s Harp of fame’ and subdued French
tyranny by protecting ‘the free’.21 The struggle
for freedom and the struggle for state
self-assertion are thus connected. Mary Shelley
makes a similar point when she observes that
the Swiss could ‘make a brave defence against
any invader of their freedom’. In other words,
they can best defend their liberty by preserving
independence and self-government (Six Weeks’
Tour, 50).
Hobhouse also connects liberty with
independence by calling the Napoleonic
conflicts ‘the late war against national
independence’ – a struggle for France’s
self-assertion against an Alliance determined to
crush its new freedoms. The success of this
aggression may ‘serve for a precedent fatal to
our own liberties’ (Last Reign, i. xi). Hobhouse
here associates general European freedom with
the capacity for states to operate independently,
unmolested by other powers. This argument is
clearly problematic, since it can be argued that
French foreign policy before and during
Napoleon’s reign violated the freedoms of other
‘independent’ states. Nevertheless, Hobhouse
advocates an idea of Europe based on ‘the
principles of national liberty’, suggesting that
greater international co-operation can be
achieved by separately-operating states,
because powers would be discouraged from
interfering in each other’s affairs. He looks
forward to the moment when ‘the alliance will
dissolve’ and ‘the first decisive triumph of the
principles of national liberty will be witnessed’.
If this occurs, ‘a new system’ of Europe can
develop, based on the freedom of separate states
(Last Reign, ii. 217). Once again, there is a
radical agenda here: Hobhouse hopes that this
revolutionary change will ‘embrace state after
state’, eventually encompassing ‘the fairest
portion of the civilised world’ (Last Reign,
ii. 217).
This association of liberty with revolution
and national self-determination would become
an important part of Byron’s thinking as his
interest in Greek independence developed in the
1820s. Before landing on the Greek mainland,
he would justify his purpose using the language
of nation-building – ’I did not come here to join
a faction, but a nation’ – and the language of
freedom: ‘the fruitful [. . . boughs?] of the tree
of Liberty’ will flourish.22 According to his
acquaintance James Kennedy (a clergyman on
Cephalonia), Byron proclaimed, ‘ “I love the
cause of liberty, which is that of the Greek
nation”‘.23 Calling on the support of Edward
Church, the United States consul in Geneva,
Byron says: ‘an American has a better right
than any other to suggest to other nations – the
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mode of obtaining that Liberty which is the
glory of his own’ (letter dated 21 June 1823,
BLJ, x. 202). In this sense, the cause of liberty
helps create both independent nationhood and a
transnational movement joined in opposition to
tyrannous government. A similar idea is
evident in some assessments of Napoleon’s
defeat. The preface to the 1816 Annual Register
says that in Germany:
popular writers had been encouraged to
arouse and create patriotic feelings by the
contrast between slavish submission to a
detestable foreign tyranny, and the
acquiescence of freemen in a constitution.
This excites anti-Napoleonic feeling by
uniting the language of liberty and nationalism.
But it also moves beyond its German specificity
to present an idea of Europe in which many
countries are connected by their shared
freedom, formed in opposition to Napoleonic
hegemony. Britain’s victory was partly assured
by ‘the liberalities of our political institutions’
and other states, including Russia, have
emulated this with ‘openness and success’. In
this last case, ‘liberty’ refers both to a national
trait and to an idea which can potentially shape
all Europe.24
Patriotism Beyond the Local
Debate about what Europe is (or what
it should be) thus hinges on a few key
concepts – ’liberty’, ‘freedom’,
‘independence’ –which can be appropriated for
a variety of ideological purposes. ‘Liberty’ can
be used to evoke a shared European tradition
and a Europe of separate states asserting
themselves against one another. These various
usages of the term ‘liberty’ might seem
contradictory. However, they can be connected
using the argument of William Hazlitt’s essay
‘On Patriotism’ (1814). In the essay, Hazlitt
theorises a nationalism which legitimises a
wider, transnational, collective identity.
Love of country, he says, ‘is little more than
another name for the love of liberty, of
independence, of peace, and social happiness’.25
In other words, patriotism inspires, not merely
a devotion to a particular state, but also a
universalist social vision, an ideal for all
societies. As J. G. A. Pocock observes, ‘patriot’
has a number of disparate meanings in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It
could signify devotion to the local nation, but
also a person ‘who loved his or her country
more than its ruling family or institutions’ and
who professed loyalty to a common identity not
represented by the national government.26
In this sense, Hazlitt can use the word both to
allude to and look beyond the nation,
evoking shared principles (‘liberty’, ‘peace’)
which are not solely applicable to a specific
state.
Hazlitt’s arguments about liberty and
patriotism rework some of Richard Price’s ideas
in Discourse on the Love of Our Country
(1789). Hazlitt was well acquainted with Price’s
thinking: Price corresponded with Hazlitt’s
father, and Hazlitt’s own letters record detailed
engagement with his works.27 It is therefore
likely that Hazlitt had read the Discourse,
especially given its heightened public
prominence (even notoriety) following Burke’s
attack on the text in Reflections on the
Revolution (1790).28 Indeed, Hazlitt alludes to
Burke’s disagreement with Price in The
Eloquence of the British Senate (1807), when
he mentions the ‘theories of Mr Burke and
Dr Price on the subject [of revolution]’.29 In the
Discourse, Price interprets the Revolution in
terms of ‘liberty’:
I have lived to see nations panting for liberty
which seemed to have no idea of it.
I have lived to see thirty millions of people
demanding liberty with an irresistible voice,
their King led in triumph, and an arbitrary
monarch surrendering himself to his
subjects.30
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Price celebrates the specific triumph of the
French state in freeing itself from despotic rule.
This is the ‘liberty’ of a state discovering its
independence, freeing itself from the weight of
past tradition and the disapproval of
neighbouring countries. In this respect, the
French Revolution has helped legitimise specific
new national identities: ‘Liberty is the [. . . ]
object of patriotic zeal [as] an enlightened
country must be a free country’ (p. 19).
However, Price also suggests that this ‘freedom’
has implications for the whole of Europe:
I see the ardour for liberty catching and
spreading a general amendment in human
affairs; the dominion of kings changed for
the dominion of laws, and the dominion of
priests giving way to the dominion of reason
and conscience. (p. 50)
The blaze of Revolution ‘lays despotism in
ashes, and warms and illuminates Europe!’
(p. 50). ‘Freedom’ establishes a patriotic
identity, marking the uniqueness of France, but
it also creates collective hopes for ‘Europe’
based on the shared principles of law, reason
and opposition to despotism. For Price, as for
Hazlitt, patriotism inspires not merely a
devotion to a particular state, but also a
universalist social vision, an ideal for all
societies. Hazlitt’s patriotism, associated with
(revolutionary) social change, therefore has
both national and transnational implications.
This is patriotism beyond the ‘local’, which
hopes for universal ‘common liberties’
extending across all Europe and beyond.
These arguments provide a useful framework
to understand Percy Shelley’s comments about
‘freedom’ in 1816. Writing to Thomas Peacock,
he connects freedom with national specificity
whilst purporting to question precisely that
connection:
You live in a free country where you may act
without restraint & possess that which you
possess in security; for as long as the name of
country & the selfish conceptions which it
included shall subsist England I am
persuaded, is the most free and refined.
(Percy Shelley, Letters, i. 474–5)
Shelley identifies and seeks to move beyond
a particularly English freedom: while declaring
his patriotic attachment to ‘England, my
country dear to me for ever’, he also critiques
the limited experiences available to one ‘who
has never passed the limits of his native land’
(Letters, i. 475). Percy Shelley advocates what
might be called a ‘cosmopolitan patriotism’,
which predicates itself on experience and
appreciation of other countries. In celebrating
and seeking to overcome the separations
between European states, Price similarly
exhorted listeners to: ‘explain the duty we owe
to our country, and the nature, foundation, and
proper expressions of that love to it’, but also
warns against ‘contempt of other countries, and
forming men into combinations and factions
against their common rights and liberties’
(Discourse, 1–2, 5). When they rail against
despotism in France, Turkey or Russia, Price
and Shelley patriotically assert Britain’s
superiority, but also regret that
‘common. . . liberties’, a cosmopolitan notion of
shared ‘rights’, have not extended there.
For Price, Hazlitt and Shelley therefore,
‘liberty’ has a parochial meaning related to state
independence and a transnational meaning
signifying the collective development of all
Europe. More importantly, these meanings are
not necessarily incompatible. For all three
writers, it is perfectly possible to be patriotic, to
defend local independence, and to hope for a
‘liberty’ which unifies states across Europe
under a common system. This is because the
key tenets of radical ‘liberty’ – opposition to
despotism, to monarchical or religious
privilege – are both national and transnational
causes. That is to say, the independence of a
specific country and the establishment of
common ‘freedom’ in Europe are part of the
same radical project. The true patriot desires
reform at home and abroad; he wishes to
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celebrate success in his own country and to
instigate changes based on common principles
across all Europe. It is therefore possible to be
both a patriot and a cosmopolitan
simultaneously, because ‘love of one’s country’
and the desire for international co-operation are
based on commitment to the same radical
principles. For the Shelley–Byron circle, ideas
of state independence and common European
liberty are not as disconnected as might first
appear, since both are founded in a radical
vision of the ideal society.
Birkbeck, University of London
Notes
1. See Byron, The Complete Poetical Works, ed.
Jerome J. McGann (7 vols, Oxford, 1980–93),
ii. 297–300 (hereafter abbreviated to PW). All
quotations from Byron’s poetry are taken from
this edition.
2. William Guthrie, A New Geographical, Historical
and Commercial Grammar; and Present State of
the Several Kingdoms of the World (London,
1770), vii. My calculation of the number of
editions is based upon the listings in the British
Library catalogue. Guthrie’s other works include
History of England from the Invasion of Julius
Caesar to 1688 (1744–51) and General History of
the World, from the Creation to the Present Time
(1764–7). See ‘Guthrie, William (1708?–1770)’,
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
(Oxford, 2004), <http://www.oxforddnb/view/
article/11792> [accessed 28 March 2008].
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